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Abstract
The issue of whether contracts promote innovation and sustainability is an important but 
overlooked aspect for achieving energy and environmental targets, as well as for creating smart 
and sustainable cities. In this article, based on the principle/agent problem and Holmström 
and Milgrom’s work on optimal contracts it is argued that the current general conditions 
of architectural and engineering consulting agreements in Sweden (ABK 09)—a standard 
type of contract often used in developer/consultant relations—may not incentivize choices 
that support the long-term goals of society. Furthermore, although this exploratory study 
specifically analyses a Swedish standard contract, the question of how contractual incentive 
structures can optimize real-world performance is a general one, and thus the article’s findings 
have general applicability. This exploratory study also points to further research into how 
contractual structures impact climate-neutral buildings. In this way, Swedish consultants who 
use ABK 09 are incentivized to include low-risk, well-proven, and widely used technologies 
in order to minimize risks for themselves. This study contributes to resolving this dilemma 
by suggesting how ABK 09 could be restructured to change the balance between incentives 
and risk and incentivize innovation and sustainability. As mentioned above, the current study 
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operates at a theoretical level. It discusses six possible changes that would better align the 
contract with the societal goals of innovation and sustainability.
Keywords
Contracts, incentives for innovation, construction sector, institutional economics, Sweden, 
buildings. 
Introduction
The pace of incorporating new technologies in the residential and construction industry is 
currently too slow to achieve today’s energy-efficiency targets. Buildings are estimated to 
account for 30-40% of overall energy use in industrialized countries, along with almost 40% 
of the CO2 emissions (Berardi, 2013). Dynamic, sustainable cities need flexible buildings that 
will meet user preferences not only today but, in the future, while simultaneously reducing the 
environmental impacts of building construction and operation. 
It is especially crucial to incentivize innovation and sustainability in order to achieve energy 
and environmental targets and to make smart and sustainable buildings and cities possible. 
Because novel technology carries risks alongside its advantages, developers, contractors, 
and consultants must have incentives to fully accept those risks if we are to meet the crucial 
long-term goals of society for the reduced use of resources and emissions. The design of 
contracts among the various parties involved is one aspect that merits investigation in order to 
understand how to incentivize faster adoption of technological innovation.
This paper focuses on an actor that has received limited attention in this context: 
consultants. The structure of the legal contract between consultants and developers or 
contractors influences their incentive to recommend new, more sustainable technologies and 
their actual recommendations to contractors on the use of such technology. 
This focus is in keeping with the focus of institutional economics on the law—and contracts 
in particular—as a crucial element in framing incentive structures for players and in achieving 
real-world outcomes of those incentive structures (Coase, 1937, 1960; North and Thomas, 
1973; North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990, 2005; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991, 1994). More 
specifically, this study uses Holmström’s and Milgrom’s theoretical framework on how to 
optimize incentive structures in the principal/agent relation (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991, 
1994) to analyse incentive structures in legal contracts between consultants and contractors. 
The well-known principal/agent problem is a defining aspect of much of economic activity, 
but it is a particularly salient feature in the construction industry, which is characterized by 
complicated networks of players. 
The thought here is that while it is relatively straightforward (and obviously necessary) 
to focus on technological and purely regulatory aspects of the transition to climate-neutral 
construction and operation, incentive structures laid out in contracts are also an important 
aspect of this transition, and one that has received little attention in the research. In view 
of the importance of the institutional economics perspective for solving so-called social 
dilemmas—that is, situations in which short-term incentives are detrimental to the long-
term stability of an asset (such as the stability of the climate) - this perspective can contribute 
substantially to hastening the shift towards smart and sustainable buildings and cities through 
climate-neutral construction and operation practices.
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This study examines one particular standard contract—ABK 09—used by consultants 
in the Swedish construction industry. ABK 09 is a widely used standard contract that has 
been developed on an ongoing basis by the non-profit organization Construction Contracts 
Committee (Construction Contracts Committee, 2015). The committee is an association that 
brings together many actors, including government authorities, civil organizations, consulting 
firms, and contractors. There are similar collaborations around the world that offer widely 
adopted standard contracts, such as the International Federation of Consulting Engineers 
(FIDIC) (Ndekugri, Smith and Hughes, 2007). 
While this study focuses on ABK 09 and the Swedish context for that contract, such 
contracts are a feature of any consultant/developer/contractor cooperative undertaking. As a 
result, although this exploratory study focuses on ABK 09, it has direct relevance for contexts 
elsewhere in the world. In effect, then, it has implications for such contractual incentive 
structures anywhere. Importantly, it also points toward further theoretical and empirical 
studies to investigate the more precise role of these contractual incentive structures in speeding 
up the transition to smart and sustainable buildings and cities through climate-neutral 
construction and operation.
This study examines the details of the contract and discusses possible negative effects of the 
various clauses of ABK 09, as well as possible ways to restructure the contract to better balance 
risks and incentives: i.e. to incentivize change and innovation so as to achieve long-term 
sustainability goals. Here, by change and innovation we mean incentives to propose, invest in, 
and install technologies that contribute to smart and sustainable buildings and cities through 
climate-neutral construction and operation. 
There are many other aspects that are important for creating the right incentives: for 
example, tax laws and building codes. In addition, it is suggested that researchers should also 
consider factors that might be of less importance in general, since secondary factors such as 
these could possibly disincentivize measures unless they also are adjusted.
The next section of this article describes the research approach used in this study, followed 
by a section on general theory. Then, after a brief introduction of laws and regulations in the 
Swedish construction sector, it delves into a detailed examination of the relevant clauses of 
the ABK. The analytical section discusses more general implications and possible remedies, 
followed by conclusions.
Research approach
The aim of this case study is primarily to identify problems in the current contract structure, 
and therefore it was decided that the best method would be an informal deductive approach. 
Deductive mathematical modelling is common in theoretical economics; although such 
models are used for different purposes, one task is to find out what can happen in certain 
situations. By making specific assumptions about the situation and the players’ motives, one 
can deduce what will happen. Because the models always include simplifying assumptions, 
it is not possible to conclude that the model faithfully reflects what would happen in reality; 
however, if the model describes what Sugden (2000) calls a credible world, the fact that certain 
things happen in the model does indicate that these same things could happen in reality. 
Even though no mathematical models were built in this article, the fundamental 
methodological idea is the same. What would be expected of a rational individual with a 
certain level of risk aversion in a specific situation—in this case, when the relationship to 
the other parties is regulated by a specific type of contract? The implications of each specific 
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section of the ABK are discussed, on the assumption that the parties involved are partly 
motivated by self-interest and are risk-averse. The study relies heavily on work from contract 
theory regarding how to optimize the principal/agent relation (Coase, 1937, 1960; Ostrom, 
1990, 2005; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991, 1994) and focuses on what rational, profit-
maximizing developers and consultants would do in different institutional environments. 
Institutional knowledge is necessary in order to build a good model. Without it, the wrong 
simplifications might be made, and the conclusions might then not yield credible predictions. 
The same risk exists when a more informal approach is used. One of the authors has worked in 
the construction sectors for several years—indeed, this background was what led to the initial 
observation that the design of the consulting contracts might be problematic. This researcher’s 
knowledge was useful in identifying the possible consequences of the contract design.
This study does not present any new empirical data and should primarily be seen as an 
exploratory study, in which theoretical exploration is used to fined-tune questions for future 
empirical studies. The possible solutions discussed here should also be investigated more 
thoroughly in future studies: for example, empirical studies that compare standard contracts in 
different countries. 
General theoretical framework
Law, rules, and regulations can be effective mechanisms to solve social dilemmas (Ostrom, 
1990). A social dilemma is a situation in which short-term incentives for the participants lead 
to actions with long-term negative consequences for society (Ostrom, 2005). Social dilemmas 
often occur in situations involving common-pool resources (Ostrom, 2005) such as rainforests, 
fresh water, clean air, or cooperatively owned buildings (Vogel, Lind and Lundqvist, 2016). 
Laws can mitigate situations where short-term individual incentives are detrimental to the 
long-term stability of shared assets (Ostrom, 1990). Broadly accepted rules and regulations 
accepted can thus serve to solve social dilemmas and secure assets of importance to the long-
term welfare of society. 
This study argues that the construction industry faces a social dilemma; in this case, the 
environment is a common-pool resource that is at the mercy of the short-term profit motive of 
individual players. From a societal perspective, we need a strong desire to construct smart and 
sustainable buildings with reduced environmental impact to a minimum thus contributing to 
the long-term survival of the planet and our species.
The questions then become how the principal legal tool for mutual exchange—the 
contract—(i) is designed, and (ii) could/should be designed to align incentives and risk 
between the developer, contractor, and consultant. 
An important theoretical starting point for this article is the work of Holmström and 
Milgrom on the optimization of contracts, in view of the ubiquitous principal/agent problem. 
When a principal contracts an agent (such as when a developer contracts a consultant or a 
contractor) to undertake some work on the principal´s behalf, there are conflicts of interest: 
the agent wants to perform the contracted work minimizing its use of resources in relation 
to the remuneration, while the principal wants the work done on time and at optimal quality. 
The relationship is also characterized by information asymmetries that adversely influence 
incentives to allocate resources in such a way as to optimize the enduring quality of what is 
produced under the contract. That is, in most cases the consultant or contractor has superior 
first-hand information about what they are producing. 
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This study has identified three main areas of contract theory in the work of Holmström 
and Milgrom that impact the social dilemma described above: risk, time, and incentives. These 
areas must be addressed in order to balance short-term self-interest against long-term societal 
interests. 
RISK
As Holmström and Milgrom (1994) point out, a perception of shared risk leads to acting on 
productive incentives. Agents can be risk-averse or risk-neutral, and contracts need to handle 
both extremes by properly managing risk versus incentives (Wahlgren, 2013; Holm, 2018). 
However, research strongly suggests that inexperienced agents are more likely to be risk-
averse and tend to provide solutions that adhere to market consensus rather than solutions put 
forward by more experienced and risk-neutral agents. Inexperienced agents simply have more 
to lose by being wrong: their capabilities are more uncertainty, and therefore they tend to “play 
it safe” and seek to avoid “standing out from the crowd” (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Hong, 
Kubik and Solomon, 2000). Studies reveal that less-risk-averse agents prefer riskier crops 
(Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002)
TIME 
Another pivotal problem in any principal/agent relationship is time. Many issues in such 
relations arise because the risk transfers from one party to the other at a certain stipulated 
time, eliminating incentives to achieve enduring quality and performance of a product. The 
issue of time is one overarching issue in the principal/agent relationship.
INCENTIVES
Contracts can be designed to incentivize performance by linking the agent’s profit to 
observable and verifiable performance benchmarks. Performance-benchmarked contracts are 
often imprecise and have well-known drawbacks insofar as they are dependent on factors that 
may be beyond the principal’s control. This results in a trade-off between offering incentives 
and sharing risks (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). To overcome some of these problems, 
Holmström (1979) developed the informativeness principle, which predicts that when an agent’s 
remuneration is linked to a performance benchmark, the contract should be indexed in such a 
way that exogenous factors do not impact the agent’s remuneration. 
Most actions in an industry are complex, multidimensional, and involve multiple actors, 
technologies, and subsystems that can only be partially observed and measured. Only 
rewarding observable activities might lead agents to focus on activities that are likely to be 
rewarded (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). Holmström and Milgrom (1991) developed a 
model of multitasking that involves substitutes in the design. Different tasks are measured 
and rewarded differently, depending on factors such as their importance, their amenability 
to measurement, risk sharing, etc. The multitasking model balances the agent’s focus among 
different potential substitutes, weighting incentives and risks so as to achieve optimal 
outcomes for both parties. The informativeness principle, which calls for a linkage between pay 
and informative measures, can be applied in simple cases. In more complex situations, where a 
balance of activities is desirable (such as in construction projects), it might be better to ignore 
some performance-related information when determining the agent’s compensation. 
The principal takeaways from Holmström’s and Milgrom’s body of work is that incentive 
structures matter hugely in avoiding sub-optimal contract performance. Focusing on 
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easily measured parameters may distort incentive structures, and so Holmström and 
Milgrom (Holmström, 1979; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991, 1994) developed a toolbox 
to fine-tune such contractual incentive structures with a view to optimizing contractual 
performance. 
Brief overview of laws and regulations in the Swedish 
construction sector
The Swedish construction sector has a few overarching laws, of which the Planning and 
Building Law (PBL) and the Boverkets Building Regulations (BBR) are the most prominent. 
The PBL contains provisions regarding the planning of land and water use and construction. 
Its provisions aim to promote sustainable community development, equitable and satisfactory 
living conditions, and long-term sustainable development for existing and future generations 
(Swedish Parliament, 2010). Under the PBL, long-term interests should outweigh short-
term interests (Prop. 1985/86:1 pp. 460). The provisions have been revised in order to foster 
active community participation in decision-making. The BBR, on the other hand, contains 
mandatory provisions and general recommendations that implement the PBL and the 
Planning and Building Regulation (PBF). The BBR dictates performance requirements for 
both residential and non-residential buildings according to geographical location and the 
selected heating system. The BBR further outlines requirements for the thermal envelope, 
energy-consuming systems, materials, and products. According to the BBR, regulatory 
compliance is to be achieved through measurement of actual energy use compared with the 
stipulated standards (Boverket, 2011).
The construction industry involves many different types of contracts among a variety 
of different parties, depending on how tasks are allocated. Several studies have analysed 
these various types of contracts: for example, Nyström, Nilsson and Lind (2016). There is 
a progressive trend away from Design-Bid-Build (DBB) to Design-Build (DB) contracts 
(Nyström, Nilsson and Lind, 2016). DB and DBB are the two main forms of contracting 
in the Swedish construction sector. In DB projects, the contractor has a certain degree of 
freedom in the design, something that is argued to support increased innovation (Nilsson and 
Nyström, 2014; Trafikverket, 2018). In DBB projects, the client is responsible for the design. 
However, case studies on road construction projects in Sweden and the UK have not evidenced 
a clear relationship between contract type, degrees of freedom, and the achievement of greater 
innovation (Hall, Holt and Graves, 2000; Nyström, Nilsson and Lind, 2016). 
This article focuses on a type of contract that has not been analysed in detail before, namely 
contracts with technical consultants. The standard template for the Swedish construction 
industry for procuring services for planning buildings is the “General Conditions of Contract 
for Consulting Agreements for Architectural and Engineering Assignments” (ABK 09). As 
noted earlier, ABK 09 is the product of the Construction Contracts Committee, a non-profit 
organization. Likewise, there are similar collaborative efforts around the world, including the 
ones developed by the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), which 
provides widely adopted standard contracts (Ndekugri, Smith and Hughes, 2007). 
Analysis of the General Conditions of Contract (ABK 09)
This study is concerned with two central actors in Swedish construction projects: developers 
(who manage and monitor the design phase) and consultants (who draw up the actual design). 
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Developers are in charge of locating buildings geographically (in cooperation with municipal 
governments), setting targets related to cost and performance, hiring consultants and 
contractors, and in some cases also establishing housing cooperatives for future homeowners. 
creating the cooperatives that will own and operate multifamily housing (Vogel, Lind and 
Lundqvist, 2016). The consultant is responsible for translating the developer’s ideas into a 
functioning building, and hence they are also important for the design and performance of 
the building. The third central player in a building’s development is the contractor, who is not 
considered here. However, the clauses and issues investigated in this study regarding the ABK 
09 standard contract also apply to the General Conditions of Contract for Building and Civil 
Engineering Works and Building Services (AB 04) and General Conditions of Contract for 
Design and Construction Contracts for Building, Civil Engineering and Installation Works 
(ABT 06), as well as to any generic principal/agent-type relationships that are formalized in a 
contract.
Now, the question is: does the current way of organizing collaboration between developers 
and consultants leads to a social dilemma—that is, is the incentive structure of ABK 09 
effective? This section investigates how a rational profit-maximizing consultant might interpret 
an important aspect of the consultant’s institutional context: namely, ABK 09. This section 
further asks whether ABK 09 adequately addresses the three main areas identified: risk, time, 
and incentives. This is undertaken by looking at each section and asking the following research 
questions: 
• Does the section in any way lead to uncompensated risks for the consultant?
• Does the section in any way lead to any uncompensated time delays for the consultant?
• Does the section in any way incentivize consultants to propose novel innovative 
technologies that can be expected to perform better and contribute more to 
sustainability than commonly used technologies?
Six sections of ABK 09 were identified that could potentially lead to weak and/or negative 
incentivization of consultants in proposing the best available technologies. However, the 
possible misalignment between short-term individual interests and long-term societal interests 
is present even in the very preamble of ABK 09. 
PREAMBLE
When negotiating ABK 09, the objective has otherwise been to frame the terms in a manner 
appropriate in scope, and also from an overall industry perspective, to reconcile the interests of Clients 
and Consultants in conjunction with the implementation of architectural and engineering consulting 
assignments. ABK 09 is premised on a reasonable balance between rights and obligations, which aims 
for the optimal allocation of financial risk between the parties. Therefore, changes to these terms shall 
be avoided.
Comments
The current contract only includes an aim for optimal allocation of financial risks. This 
makes the current contract rather narrow since it does not mention building operation and 
sustainability in the design phase. It is important to include risks other than financial risks, 
such as technological risks and environmental risks. It is furthermore important to align shared 
risk over the term of a contract.
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CHAPTER 2, SECTION 1
The Consultant shall implement the assignment in a professional manner and with due care, and 
shall also generally observe sound professional practices. (Construction Contracts Committee, 
2009)
Comments
The requirement concerning professionalism and sound professional practice is not 
troublesome per se and may seem rather sound. However, there is no precise definition or 
description of the term professionalism in the context of planning and constructing buildings. 
As described in Section 3 above, research reveals that inexperienced agents tend to provide 
solutions that align more closely with the market consensus compared to solutions that 
more experienced agents propose. Inexperienced agents have more to lose by being wrong 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000). Without further clarification, 
this term could therefore result in relatively inexperienced consultants, in particular, being 
afraid to propose new technologies in light of the risk of being judged “unprofessional” or of 
having offered something that is not yet “sound professional practice.”
CHAPTER 2, SECTION 6
The Client’s approval does not discharge the Consultant from liability for data, the result of 
investigations, or technical solutions. However, the Consultant shall be discharged from liability 
where the Consultant proposed or presented technical solutions which the Consultant deems to 
be associated with particular risks and the Client approved the solutions. At the request of the 
Consultant, the Client shall provide an answer in such matters of approval. (Construction 
Contracts Committee, 2009)
If the Consultant proposes or presents a technical solution which the Consultant deems to be 
associated with particular risks, the demand for professionalism requires that the Consultant notify 
the Client of them and of the advantages and disadvantages that exist. (Construction Contracts 
Committee, 2009)
Comments
The consultant should, according to Chapter 2, Section 1, implement the assignment in a 
professional manner with due care and should also generally observe sound professional 
practices. This means that in order for the consultant to propose a novel innovative 
technology—one that according to current research can ensure the best technical and 
economic results for the client—the consultant must be sure that the technology performs 
well over a relatively long time period (10 years; see Section 2, Chapter 5). Novel innovative 
technologies are arguably associated with an increased risk compared to older, well-known, 
but less-efficient technologies. Moreover, the multitasking model reveals that agents will 
allocate their effort away from uncompensated activities and toward compensated activities. 
Investigating the exact level of “professionalism” related to a specific measure or technique is 
arguably an uncompensated activity. Further, the model discusses aggregate output. Proposing 
a novel innovative technology will most certainly also affect other parts of the building 
that might be outside of the consultants’ control and that would require the cooperation of 
teams of consultants. If it is only possible to measure aggregate output, it may be difficult to 
contractually provide optimal incentives for each consultant due to the moral hazard of teams.
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According to Section 6, Chapter 2, consultants are released from liability if the Client 
approves of the proposed solution, even if it might be associated with risks. However, there 
is a risk that the client might still pursue a liability claim against the consultant because they 
cannot be expected to have adequate knowledge of the proposed new solution. Current trends 
(Vogel et al., 2015) reveal decreasing technical competence on the developer side, along with 
increased usage of DB contracts, arguably making it more difficult successfully argue for a 
transfer of liability (Nyström, Nilsson and Lind, 2016). 
This research also question the view of the relationship between client and consultant since 
the text states that the consultant should ask for permission to use certain kinds of technology 
instead of seeing it as more of a partnership relationship in which the parties share the upside/
downside of riskier technologies. In passing, it is noted that this is in line with seeing the law 
as a fundamental instrument for lowering transaction costs, thereby leading to a more efficient 
outcome. 
CHAPTER 4, SECTION 2
The Consultant is entitled to an extension of time if the Consultant is delayed due to circumstances 
which the Consultant has not caused and the effect of which the Consultant could not reasonably have 
eliminated. (Construction Contracts Committee, 2009)
Comments
Chapter 4, Section 2, entitles the Consultant to an extension of time if the delay is caused by 
circumstances that the Consultant could not reasonably have eliminated. If the Consultant 
proposes to use novel technologies without the Client’s approval, then the Consultant most 
probably will not have the right to an extension of time, due to the premise of professionalism 
stated in Section 1, Chapter 2. This further increases the risk of trying to introduce new 
technologies, since such cases are likely to require extra time, especially in the case of smart 
buildings with complex, interacting systems.
In keeping with the comment above, we would call for more emphasis on the partnership 
aspect between the parties to the contract.
CHAPTER 4, SECTION 6
Liquidated damages may be agreed to for exceeding a specified deadline for delivery of the entire or 
part of the assignment. Where the Consultant exceeds this deadline and is not entitled to an extension 
of time, the agreed-to liquidated damages shall be paid. If liquidated damages have not been agreed 
to, the Consultant may be liable for damages for the delay. (Construction Contracts Committee, 
2009)
Comments
If the introduction of novel innovative technologies results in time delays, the Consultant 
might not be entitled to an extension of time as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 2, and hence 
will be forced to pay liquidated damages. As argued in the comments of Chapter 2, Section 6, 
smart and sustainable buildings employ multiple interconnected systems and materials, and 
if it is only possible to measure aggregate output, it may be difficult to contractually provide 
optimal incentives for each consultant due to the moral hazard of teams. Single consultants 
hired using an ABK 09 contract might therefore have weak incentives to propose novel 
innovative technologies due to the increased risk of having to pay damages.
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The issue of damages is a standard remedy for compensating parties in private legal 
disputes. Historically, damages have been a very successful instrument for handling risks 
related to long-distance maritime transport (Greif, 2006). However, this model of damages 
is one of distrust and not of shared risks. With that in mind, damages may be seen as a sign 
of distrust in the contractual relation, and this exploratory study suggests that contractual 
measures involving the sharing of risk over time are an important area for follow-up research.
CHAPTER 5, SECTION 1
Subject to the limitations below, the Consultant is liable for damage that the Consultant has caused 
the Client through lack of professionalism, disregard for customary due care, or other negligence in the 
implementation of the assignment. Where the Client has shown that damage has occurred and has 
made likely that the damage is due to an error in the Consultant´s documents or an omission by the 
Consultant, the Consultant must show that the Consultant is not liable for the damage in order to 
exempt itself from liability. (Construction Contracts Committee, 2009)
The damage covered by the term need not consist of property damage but may also concern, for 
example, financial damage. (Construction Contracts Committee, 2009) 
Comments
Section 1 of Chapter 5 adds another dimension to the problem of liability. In the commentary 
section, financial damage is also included among the damage that the consultant can be held 
liable for. This section could be used against consultants that do not propose to use novel 
innovative technologies that could, for example, lower a client’s operation costs. At some point, 
novel innovative technologies become standard technology and hence the technology that 
should be used by a consultant acting with the professionalism that is called for in Section 1, 
Chapter 2. The risk related to omission of new and better technologies is, in reality, small, since 
it could always be argued that the risk of using new technology is higher and the consultant 
can thus explain and defend their use of traditional but less efficient technology. These well-
established technologies might also be familiar to a client with less technological knowledge, 
and therefore it is unlikely that they would question it. Using well-established technologies 
is thus less risky than proposing new technologies, even though the latter are both more 
sustainable and more profitable. 
CHAPTER 5, SECTION 2
The Consultant is liable for damage discovered within ten years of the date on which the Consultant’s 
assignment is completed or otherwise terminated. (Construction Contracts Committee, 2009)
Comments
Section 2, Chapter 5 adds further risk for the Consultant, typically without any upside. When 
introducing novel innovative technologies, it is the client who will receive the benefits—
through decreased operation costs, for example—but the risk remains with the consultant for 
quite a long time. 
The incentive to invest in collaboration depends on the parties´ expectations of how the 
surplus will be shared. Ownership of assets is rather clear in the construction sector but 
sharing of future profits related to decreased operating and maintenance costs, as well as future 
service production in buildings, is typically not included in the consulting contract. This is a 
further area in which future research may significantly improve the inventive structures for 
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consultant contracts in order to optimize outcomes in terms of smart, eco-friendly buildings 
and cities.
General analysis and recommendations 
By looking at the current industry practice for collaboration (ABK 09) through the lens of 
relevant parts of contract theory, this study pinpoints areas where ABK 09 theoretically could 
lead to misalignment between short-term incentives for individual agents and the long-term 
goals of both companies and society, thus contributing to a social dilemma in which the 
climate is the asset that is sacrificed (Ostrom, 1990).
RISK AND INCENTIVES
The consultant risks being held liable for damage connected to novel innovative technologies, 
while the client reaps the benefits of installing such technologies. The consultant risks
• being held liable for damage connected to proposed novel innovative technologies, 
• forfeiting the possibility of time extension, and
• being forced to pay penalties if the assignment is delayed due to the introduction of 
novel innovative technologies.
The client, on the other hand, risks missing the opportunity to get the best available 
technology installed. This can lead to increased operating costs and to missed opportunities 
and/or future additional costs to reap the benefits of future interconnected smart cities. 
The current trend of using DB contracts instead of DBB contracts is supposed to lead to 
increased levels of freedom for contractors and consultants and thereby stimulate innovation. 
However, assigning too much risk to the consultant (or the contractor) might be one reason 
why there have been no clear signs of increased innovation under these contracts in Sweden 
(see Lind and Borg, 2010; Nyström, Nilsson and Lind, 2016). 
TIME
ABK 09 describes the apportionment of liabilities between the parties, but only focuses on 
the deadlines and scope of the current collaboration. The actual outcome of the process (how 
the building works during the operation stage) is not part of the collaboration. Hence, the 
incentive to focus on long-term sustainability is weak. To stimulate the parties to use contracts 
that contribute to solving a social dilemma it is important to discuss the sharing of risks over 
time. It is also important to include risks other than financial risks, such as technology risks, 
emissions risks, etc. Finally, this research seeks to challenge the recommendation that “changes 
to these terms shall be avoided.” Instead, it is considered important that the contract structure 
a process for changing contractual terms, should such a change improve the balance of risks 
and incentives for implementing new technologies that reduce emissions and the climate 
impact of a building. 
TERM OF LIABILITY
In ABK 09 the same liability period applies to beams and pillars and to HVAC systems and 
information and communication technologies (ICT), even though the long-run consequences 
of new technologies are more difficult to predict. Moreover, due to rapid technological 
development, the turnover of modern ICT systems is probably actually shorter than the term 
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of liability. Different terms of liability for different systems could incentivize the use of newer 
technologies. 
THE CONCEPT OF PROFESSIONALISM
The use of the concept of professionalism in ABK 09 is a potential problem. Professionalism 
could be interpreted as the use of the latest technology in order to reduce resource usage 
and emissions, but it could also be understood as the use of proven technologies that are less 
efficient. Professionalism could be interpreted as performing a lifecycle analysis of the building 
as a system, but it could also be interpreted as calculating the direct costs for implementing a 
specific measure. New technology carries a risk as the downside of its advantages and finding 
measures that fall on the right side of risk/reward line that divides risk-free technologies 
from unproven, risky technologies, means looking into the past. Products and methods 
eventually shift from new and risky to well-proven and risk-free, but never without testing 
the technologies in real-world environments (Borg, 2015). Novel energy-saving technologies 
cannot be implemented today without adding risk to the actors who introduce them. 
Moreover, younger, inexperienced consultants might not dare to propose novel technologies 
and their associated risks due to the possibility of damaging their reputation (Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1990; Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000). Research has also found that so-called 
“dominant shareholders” are better clients/principals (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) and 
also that less-risk-averse consultants/agents prefer riskier crops, the so-called selection bias 
(Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002). However, teams of experienced developers with extensive 
knowledge of both details and operation, or developers with teams of experienced and trusted 
consultants, can make efficient choices under today’s standard contracts. The problems 
discussed above are heightened when inexperienced or risk-averse consultants work together 
with poorly informed clients. In such a constellation there will be weak incentives for either 
party to prioritize sustainability and the long-term environmental impact of a building. 
POSSIBLE REMEDIES
In order to achieve innovation and sustainability and to make smart and sustainable buildings 
and cities possible, contracts should be designed to capitalize on the full potential of the 
consultants’ and contractors’ technical knowledge, as well as the developers’ operational 
knowledge. The four areas described above must be handled and/or investigated in order to 
incentivize all parties to the contract to promote and invest in smart, ecofriendly technology 
and climate-neutral construction and operation. 
To balance the incentives and risks among the principals and agents (in this study, 
developers and consultants), this research proposes that the following points be considered 
in a future revision of the general contract terms in ABK 09 and other construction-related 
standard contracts in other countries:
• Differentiate liability periods between systems that are necessary for operation 
(framing, vapor barriers, roofing, etc.) and systems that are optional and continually 
undergoing changes and upgrades (ICT systems). 
• Incentivize consultants and contractors through the sharing of future profits, 
allocating responsibilities and rewards not only during planning and construction but 
also operational benefits and responsibilities. This is often referred to as a performance 
contract. The multitasking model (Holmström and Milgrom, 1994) indicates that 
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agents (consultants) will redirect their efforts away from uncompensated activities and 
toward compensated activities. There are a number of problems with long-term incentive 
contracts, but it would at a minimum be possible to have a five-year bonus system for 
consultants related to benchmarks for certain specific costs. 
• Formalize the procedure for identifying specific technologies and systems as 
professionally prudent to use. Standardize the methods for testing and evaluation, 
possibly also including suppliers. This change would preferably be implemented on 
a national level, in order to comply with national building regulations and other 
framework regulations, such as the municipal planning monopoly. 
• Incentivize knowledge transfer: The study indicates that it would also be desirable to 
see some kind of process that mitigates risk aversion among less experienced consultants, 
so that there are incentives for exchange on these matters between client and 
consultant, and so that the process of exchange in the contract inherently incentivizes 
new technology and apportions the associated risks. New technologies might also be 
evaluated by academic committees or government authorities, as Borg (2015) discusses.
• Include building performance or building operation into the overall objective. The 
contract could be changed to include not only an aim for optimal allocation of financial 
risks but also long-term building performance and sustainability.
• Damages should be limited to extreme cases of distrust in the contractual 
relationship, and in other cases should be replaced by a model of risk sharing. The 
sharing of risks should be tied to relevant criteria, so that the parties to the contract 
are incentivized to spend time on work that actual contributes to partnership and risk 
sharing, possibly a model that builds on Holmström’s multitasking model (Holmström 
and Milgrom, 1991). The model of damages is one of distrust and not necessarily one of 
shared risk.
Conclusion
In this study it has been argued that the construction industry faces a social dilemma; in this 
case, the environment is the common-pool resource that is at the mercy of individual players’ 
short-term incentives for profit. From a societal perspective, strong incentives are needed to 
construct smart and sustainable buildings that minimize environmental impacts and that 
contribute to the survival of the planet and our species over the long term.
Here the study has sought to contribute ideas on how to incentivize the construction of 
smart and sustainable buildings, by identifying misalignments related to risk and incentives 
in a Swedish standardized contract, ABK 09, which is often used in developer/consultant 
relationships. This paper also proposes how the standard contract could be restructured to 
make it attractive for developers to pursue climate-neutral building construction and operation 
and ultimately resolve the social dilemma described above. 
This study first asks how the contract is designed, then asks how it might be redesigned to 
align incentives and risk among developer, contractor, and consultant. Three main areas have 
been identified in contract theory that could impact the social dilemma described above. These 
areas—risk, time, and incentives—are vital to manage in order to balance short-term self-
interest against long-term societal interests. 
By looking at the current industry practices for collaboration (ABK 09) through the lens 
of the relevant parts of contract theory—in particular the work of Holmström and Milgrom 
on optimal contracts—six sections in ABK 09 were identified that contain weak or negative 
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incentives for consultants to propose the best available technologies that would favour climate-
neutral construction and building operation. These sections and the misalignments they 
contain mostly concern risks versus incentives, deadlines, and liabilities. 
Based on the misalignments that were identified, six possible structural changes to standard 
contracts as instruments for optimized distribution of risk and incentives were put forward 
that, in turn, are conducive to bridging the social dilemma of ultimate concern. 
The general terms of ABK 09 function well and are widely used. The vast majority of 
planning processes in Sweden use the standard agreement “General Conditions of Contract 
for consulting Agreements for Architectural and Engineering Assignments” (ABK 09) as 
the basis for collaboration between developers and consultants. The document is vital for the 
process of planning buildings in Sweden and assures stability. However, in order to make 
smart and sustainable buildings an achievable reality, no matter their origin, contracts must 
encourage consultants and contractors to use their full technical and operational potential 
starting in the design phase. Risks and incentives must be balanced so as to involve all parties 
in investigating, promoting, and investing in innovative sustainable solutions. Undoubtedly 
the knowledge, technologies, and materials are available to drastically improve building 
performance and service production, while at the same time lowering the associated resource 
usage. However, the processes to actually identify and implement these technologies are not 
aligned with current technological development. 
Even though this study focuses on ABK 09 and the Swedish context for that contract, 
similar contracts are a feature of any consultant/contractor cooperation. As such, this 
exploratory study has direct relevance for contexts other than Sweden and has implications for 
such contractual incentive structures anywhere. It is hoped that this study encourages others 
to investigate the role of incentive structures in locally used standard contracts as a means 
to hasten the transition to smart and sustainable buildings and cities, and climate-neutral 
construction and operation. The results of this study indicate a need for others to initiate 
similar attempts at optimizing standard contracts in the construction industry as a means to 
achieve societal climate goals.
If existing structures are left unchanged, there is a risk of ending up in a situation where 
society desires innovation and sustainability but does not incentivize these goals. The 
misaligned incentives, the demand for professionalism, and the asymmetrical distribution 
of knowledge in the construction sector create a risk of stagnation in building innovation. If 
clients do not take responsibility for demanding novel innovative technologies (which is not a 
reasonable expectation if they have less information concerning such technologies), consultants 
need to be incentivized to propose the use of such technologies, making smart and sustainable 
buildings the norm instead of something for the dedicated few. 
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